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Abstract. We prove the unconditional security of a quantum key dis-
tribution (QKD) protocol on a noisy channel against the most general
attack allowed by quantum physics. We use the fact that in a previous
paper we have reduced the proof of the unconditionally security of this
QKD protocol to a proof that a corresponding Quantum String Oblivious
Transfer (String-QOT) protocol would be unconditionally secure against
Bob if implemented on top of an unconditionally secure bit commitment
scheme. We prove a lemma that extends a security proof given by Yao
for a (one bit) QOT protocol to this String-QOT protocol. This result
and the reduction mentioned above implies the unconditional security of
our QKD protocol despite our previous proof that unconditionally secure
bit commitment schemes are impossible.
1 Introduction and Brief History
One of the most popular application of quantum physics to cryptography is
quantum key distribution (QKD). In an ideal QKD, Alice and Bob who share
no secret information initially, share a secret string s at the end. An eavesdrop-
per, typically called Eve, should learn nothing about the secret string s, except
perhaps for its length.
In this paper, we prove the security of a QKD protocol against the most
general attack allowed by quantum physics. This QKD protocol works with a
noisy quantum channel, an imperfect measuring apparatus, but requires a perfect
source and a faithful classical channel. A channel is faithful if no one can modified
a message sent in the channel without being detected. The need for a faithful
classical channel is not a problem because a secret string s0 initially shared
between Alice and Bob can be used to simulate a faithful classical channel by
use of an unconditionally secure classical authentication scheme [26]. We assume
a perfect source to avoid the technical difficulty associated with many photons
per pulse.
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Our preliminary version of the protocol uses a random linear code for er-
ror correction. Random linear codes are very difficult to decode. However, this
problem can be solved and a version of the protocol using an efficient error cor-
recting code and with no requirement for a perfect source will be considered in
the journal version of this paper.
In addition to QKD, other applications of quantum physics to cryptography
have been proposed. The most popular are quantum bit commitment (QBC)
and quantum oblivious transfer (QOT). We briefly review these protocols since
we shall refer to them in our results. In the bit commitment task from Alice to
Bob, Alice commits a bit b. Later, if Bob asks Alice to unveil the commitment,
he receives the bit b. The main point is that Alice cannot change the value of b
and Bob learns nothing about b unless Alice unveils it. In the oblivious transfer
task from Alice to Bob, Alice enters a bit b, Bob receives a perfectly random bit
c and he learns the value of b if and only if c = 0. Alice learns nothing about c.
The first quantum bit commitment protocol ever proposed is due to Bennett
and Brassard [2]. The authors themselves knew at the time that this protocol
is insecure. Other quantum bit commitment protocol have been proposed, but
none of them could be proven unconditionally secure. In fact, it has been shown
recently that unconditional security for quantum bit commitment is impossi-
ble [18, 19, 20]. A proof of computational security for a quantum bit commit-
ment protocol is still possible, but none is currently available. The absence of a
provably secure bit commitment is unfortunate because all the known quantum
oblivious transfers are built on top of bit commitment, that is, they use quantum
bit commitment as a sub-protocol.
The first quantum oblivious transfer protocol which would be secure if im-
plemented on top of a secure bit commitment protocol has been proposed by
Cre´peau [12]. Its security against most but not all reasonable attacks allowed by
the current technology has been shown in [5]. The first proof that considered the
most general attack allowed by quantum physics, including the so called coher-
ent measurements on many photons at a time, has been obtained by Yao [27].
Yao’s proof is an important step and provides useful techniques, but it provides
no security because, as for all the previous proofs [5, 21], it requires a secure bit
commitment and none has yet been proven secure.
Now, we are back to QKD. The security of a QKD protocol against most but
not all reasonable attacks allowed by the current technology has been established
in [3, 4]. In [17], we have reduced the unconditional security of any QKD protocol
of a certain kind to a proof that a corresponding String-QOT protocol would
be unconditionally secure if implemented on top of an unconditionally secure
bit commitment scheme. A QKD protocol of the appropriate type is associated
with a corresponding String-QOT protocol. The standard QOT protocol in Yao’s
proof turns out to be associated with a QKD protocol of the appropriate type.
Therefore, the unconditional security of this QKD protocol is obtained from the
above reduction. However, there are two problems with this protocol. First, the
QOT protocol in Yao’s proof is a standard one bit QOT, therefore only one
secret bit is returned in the QKD version. One can repeat the protocol n times
to obtain a secret string of length n, but an initial secret key s0 is required to
simulate a faithful classical channel and, therefore, each execution of the protocol
uses more secret bits than it returns back! Second, the QOT protocol in Yao’s
proof, and thus the corresponding QKD protocol, requires a noiseless quantum
channel and a perfect source.
In this paper, to pursue the original idea of [17], we extend Yao’s proof to a
String-QOT protocol associated via the above reduction with a “strong” QKD
protocol. Therefore, we have the unconditional security of this QKD protocol.
This QKD protocol returns a secret string s that is longer than the required
initial string s0. Also, it works in a noisy quantum channel. Note that our proof
for this QKD protocol considers any kind of errors in Bob’s apparatus because
we give full control over both the channel and the apparatus to a dishonest Bob
in String-QOT.
It is shown in [6] that the security of any OT protocol implies the security of
a String-OT protocol. In particular, the security of the QOT protocol in Yao’s
proof implies the security of a String-QOT protocol. However, the security of the
resulting String-QOT protocol does not imply the security of a QKD protocol via
the above reduction because it is not of the required type. Yao did not mention
the possibility of generalizing his proof to the String-QOT case. It should be said
that Yao was not aware of the above reduction (or did not believe it) at the time
he wrote his paper [27]. Yao has announced in [27] that in the journal version of
his paper the QOT protocol will work on a noisy channel but our String-QOT
protocol has been designed to work on a noisy channel without much additional
effort.
2 Related results
The main problem that one must address in the design of a QKD protocol is
that Alice and Bob must exchange quantum systems, let say photons, and there
is no way to distinguish interaction of these photons with the environment and
interaction of these photons with Eve’s measuring apparatus. Therefore, Eve can
always succeed to entangle her measuring apparatus with the exchanged photons
without being detected. Later, if these photons are used to define the shared key,
Eve can obtain information about this key. However, using privacy amplification
techniques, one can make this information arbitrarily small. For example, in the
QKD protocol considered in this paper, a classical string w′ ∈ {0, 1}N is stored
in N photons traveling from Alice to Bob. Because Eve can obtain information
about w′, privacy amplification must be used to distill from w′ a shorter but
secret string b = h(w′). Privacy amplification is an essential part of any QKD
protocol. Privacy amplification in the QOT protocol of Yao’s proof corresponds
to the fact that the secret bit is the exclusive or of all the bits of w′.
Much after the BB84 protocol of [2] have been proposed, Ekert suggested a
scheme in which EPR pairs are created and the photons in each pair are split
between Alice and Bob [15]. In this EPR scheme, no information is stored in
the photons before they are sent, therefore one would hope that no information
can be extracted by Eve. However, Eve can still entangle her apparatus with
the photons and it has been shown that the kind of attacks that could work
against the BB84 scheme correspond to attacks that would work against this
EPR scheme [8]. This result highly suggested that EPR pairs might not be useful
for quantum cryptography.
However, recently Deutsch, Ekert and al. proposed another EPR-based pro-
tocol with a new element, an entanglement purification procedure also called
in this context a quantum privacy amplification procedure [14]. Entanglement
purification [9] allows Alice and Bob to generate, from any supply of pairs of
photons with non-zero entanglement, a smaller set of maximally entangled EPR
pairs whose entanglement with any outside system, including Eve’s apparatus,
is arbitrarily low. Deutsch, Ekert and al. reasonably argue that their protocol
is unconditionally secure against the most general attack allowed by quantum
physics. An interesting point is that privacy amplification is done at the quan-
tum level, and one can hope that this kind of privacy amplification procedure
is more efficient. On the other hand, working prototypes for protocol that use
simple quantum coding schemes already exist [24, 25, 22, 23, 16], whereas the
technology required for this EPR-based protocol is not yet available.
Let us emphasis that in a security proof for a QKD or a String-QOT protocol
one must consider carefully the criteria to reject or accept an execution of the
protocol. This criteria always exists for a given lower bound on the length of the
shared key or string. In the case of our String-QOT protocol, Alice must detect
less than δn errors. One must show that this criteria implies that the cheater
cannot succeed. This analysis is difficult in the case of the most general attack
allowed by quantum physics and to our knowledge only Yao’s paper [27] deals
rigorously with this issue.
The purpose of quantum cryptography is not only to prove the security of
protocols. We also want to design more efficient protocols and see how efficient
are these protocols in theory and in practice. Biham and Mor have obtained the
maximal theoretical efficiency of the QKD protocol of [1] against a restricted
but still reasonable type of attacks [10]. Furthermore, it is reasonable to believe
that we could eventually prove that the security parameter required against this
restricted type of attack is not too far from the security parameter required
against the most general attack.
3 Some algebra
Typically, a quantum protocol involves many systems and each system is as-
sociated with its own Hilbert space H also called a state space. For example,
the polarization of a photon is associated with a two dimensional Hilbert space.
The inner product of H evaluated on (|φ〉, |ψ〉) ∈ H2 is denoted 〈φ|ψ〉. For every
vector |φ〉 ∈ H, let |φ〉† : H → C be be the linear functional on H which, when
evaluated on any vector |ψ〉 ∈ H, simply returns the inner product 〈φ|ψ〉. For
obvious reason, |φ〉† is more conveniently denoted 〈φ|. In terms of matrices, one
represents a vector |ψ〉 ∈ H as a column matrix. The operation “†” on a matrix
is simply the transpose conjugate, therefore 〈ψ| is represented by a row matrix.
The space of linear functionals on H is denoted H†. It is called the dual
of H. The inner product of H is also an operation on the cartesian product
H† ×H. This operation can be generalized to any cartesian product of the form
G1 × . . . × Gn where each space Gi occurs only once and is either a state space
H or its dual. We simply let any functional 〈φ| ∈ Gi = H
† operate on the state
|ψ〉 ∈ Gj = H to its right, if one exists. Every thing else should not be simplified.
For example, consider |φ1〉 ∈ H1, 〈ψ1| ∈ H
†
1, |φ2〉 ∈ H2 and 〈ψ2| ∈ H
†
2. We have
〈ψ1|ψ2〉|φ1〉〈ψ2| = λ1|ψ2〉〈φ2| where λ1 = 〈ψ1|φ1〉 ∈ C. The object M = |ψ2〉〈φ2|
cannot be simplified, but it can operate on other objects. For instance M on
|η2〉〈φ3| ∈ H2×H
†
3 returns |ψ2〉〈φ2|η2〉〈φ3| = λ2|ψ2〉〈φ3| where λ2 = 〈φ2|η2〉 ∈ C.
The tensor product G1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ Gn can be interpreted as the span of the
product G1 × . . . × Gn. If |φ1〉|φ2〉 and |ψ1〉|ψ2〉 belong to H1 × H2 then the
sum |φ1〉|φ2〉 + |ψ1〉|ψ2〉 belongs to H1 ⊗ H2. A formal definition of this tensor
product is usually not so enlightening, so none is given here, but the basic idea is
simply to extend by linearity the operations that are defined above. Two objects
that cannot be distinguished via these operations (neither as operators or as
operands) are considered to be identical. One should notice the following rules:
– For every H, every pair of objects in H ∪H† does not commute, but every-
thing else commute.
– Because 〈φ|ψ〉 = 〈ψ|φ〉∗, where “∗”denotes the complex conjugate, we have
|〈ψ|φ〉|2 = 〈ψ|φ〉〈φ|ψ〉 = 〈φ|ψ〉〈ψ|φ〉.
– For any objects M1, . . . ,Mn, we have (M1 . . .Mn)
† = M †n . . .M
†
1 . In partic-
ular, (|ψ〉〈φ|)† = |φ〉〈ψ|.
The trace of an operator M ∈ H ⊗ H†, i.e., from H into H, is defined by
Tr(M) =
∑
α〈ψα|M |ψα〉 where {|ψ〉α} is any orthonormal basis of H. This
definition is independent of the basis {|ψα〉}.
For z, z′ ∈ {0, 1}n, (z ⊕ z′) ∈ {0, 1}n is given by (z ⊕ z′)i = zi ⊕ z
′
i =
zi + z
′
i (mod 2), and z ⊙ z
′ = ⊕i(zi × z
′
i). The set {0, 1} with the operation ⊕
and the ordinary product is a finite field denoted GF(2). The set GF(2)n with
the operation ⊕ is a vector space over the field GF(2). Let f be a m×n boolean
matrix and z a boolean string of length n, the product fz is the ordinary matrix
operation with the sum modulo 2 where z is seen as a boolean column matrix.
4 Quantum preliminaries
The state of a system, also called a pure state, is represented by a vector |ψ〉 of
norm 1 in the associated Hilbert space H. The state space of a system made of
n subsystems with state spaces H1, . . . ,Hn is the tensor product H1⊗ . . .⊗Hn.
A completely refined measurement on H is a set of outcomes v where every
outcome v is associated with a vector |φv〉 ∈ H, but here the norm could be
anything between 0 and 1. The probability of v given the initial state |ψ〉 ∈ H
is simply |〈φv|ψ〉|
2 = 〈φv|ψ〉〈ψ|φv〉. The only requirement on the states |φv〉 is
that
∑
v |φv〉〈φv | = I, the identity operator. This is equivalent to say that, for
every initial state |ψ〉, the sum of the probabilities over the outcomes v is 1.
The final quantum state left after the measurement is some state |v〉 which
should not be confused with the vector |φv〉. The operation associated with v is
given by Mv = |v〉〈φv|. One may check that the probability of v given the initial
state |ψ〉 is ‖Mv|ψ〉‖
2, the square of the norm of Mv|ψ〉. The final state |v〉 can
be anything because just at the end of the measurement one is free to store the
residual quantum information into the final state |v〉 of his choice. If Ω = {|φv〉}
is a basis of H, a measurement in the basis Ω is simply the measurement that
associate v to |φv〉. Such a measurement is called an orthogonal measurement.
Now, let us generalize to incomplete measurement the above definition. The
most general measurement on H is a set of outcome k where every outcome k
is associated with an operator Mk on H. The difference with a complete mea-
surement is that Mk is in general a sum Mk =
∑
v |v〉〈φv | rather than only a
rank one operator Mk = |k〉〈φk|. The only requirement on the operators Mk is
that
∑
kM
†
kMk = I. The image of Mk can be any sufficiently large state space
Hk, because just at the end of the measurement one is free to store the residual
quantum information into the system of his choice. For example, the quantum
information can be send from the state space of a photon into the state space of
an atom. The probability of k given an initial state |ψ〉 is ‖Mk|ψ〉‖
2.
Every measurement M on a state space H which returns an outcome k can
be refined by executing another measurement M′ on Hk. The new measurement
M′ may depend upon k. Let M ′v be the operation on Hk associated with the
outcome v of M′. The operation on the original space H associated with the
overall outcome (v, k) is simply M(v,k) =M
′
vMk.
If a quantum preparation contains a pure state |ψα〉 with probability pα,
then one may conveniently represent this preparation by the operator ρ =∑
α pα |ψα〉〈ψα|. The idea is that the probability of v given the preparation
represented by ρ is simply 〈φv|ρ|φv〉. This works even if the initial states |ψα〉
are not orthogonal. Note the important fact that two distinct preparations may
correspond to a same density operator. Even for an incomplete measurement on
a given preparation, one may use the density operator ρ of this preparation to
compute the probability of an outcome k. We have that Pr(K = k|ρ) = Tr(Πkρ),
where Πk = M
†
kMk. This trace is linear on Πk and linear on ρ. Therefore, it
is often advantageous to work with Πk and ρ rather than with Mk and |ψα〉.
The matrix representation of the operator ρ in the basis {|ψα〉} is defined by
(ρ)α,α′ = 〈ψα|ρ|ψα′〉.
In accordance with the BB84 coding scheme, the states |0〉+, |0〉×, |1〉+ and
|1〉× corresponds to one photon polarized at 0
◦, 45◦, 90◦ and−45◦ degrees respec-
tively. Note that + and × corresponds to the bases {|0〉+, |1〉+} and {|0〉×, |1〉×}
respectively. For every θ ∈ {+,×}n and every w ∈ {0, 1}n, |ψw,θ〉 denotes the
product state |w1〉θ1 . . . |wn〉θn . For any set of positions E = {γ1, . . . , γN}, let
w[E] be the string given by w[E]i = wγi , 1 ≤ i ≤ N , and let |ψw,θ[E]〉 be the
product state |wi1〉θi1 . . . |wiN 〉θiN for the photons with position in E.
5 The String-QOT protocol and its security
The QOT protocol considered by Yao in [27] is a variant of the QOT protocol
which has been first proposed by Cre´peau [11, 12] and improved later in [5, 13].
We consider the natural generalization of this single bit QOT protocol to a
string QOT. In this String-QOT protocol, n is the number of photons sent in
the protocol, b is the string sent by Alice, m is the length of b, r is the number
of redundant bits needed for error correction, and N = ⌊.24n⌋ is the length of
the string shared between Alice and Bob before privacy amplification.
STRING-QOT(b)
1. Alice picks a random uniformly chosen (r+m)×N boolean matrix f where
the r first rows define a matrix g used for error correction and them following
rows define a matrix h used for privacy amplification (see step 7).
2. Bob picks a random uniformly chosen θˆ = θˆ1 . . . θˆn ∈ {+,×}
n and makes a
quantum commit of all θˆi to Alice.
3. Alice picks a random uniformly chosen w ∈ {0, 1}n, a random uniformly
chosen θ ∈ {+,×}n, and sends to Bob n photons in the state |ψw,θ〉.
4. Bob measures every photon i in basis θˆi, record the results wˆi and makes a
quantum commit of all n bits wˆi to Alice.
5. Alice picks a random uniformly chosen subset R ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and tests the
commitment made by Bob at positions i ∈ R. If more than δn positions
i ∈ R reveal θi = θˆi and wi 6= wˆi, then Alice stops the protocol; otherwise,
the test result is accepted.
6. Alice announces the string θ. Let T0 be the set of all i with θi = θˆi, and let
T1 be the set of all i with θi 6= θˆi. Bob chooses a set E0 ⊆ T0 − R, a set
E1 ⊆ T1 − R, where |E0| = |E1| = N , and announces {E0, E1} in random
order to Alice.
7. Alice chooses at random a set Ec ∈ {E0, E1}. For error correction, she an-
nounces the matrix g and the string s = g w[Ec]. For the computation of b,
she announces the matrix h and the string a = b⊕ (hw[Ec]).
8. If c = 0, Bob obtains w[Ec] by correcting the errors in wˆ[Ec], then he
computes the intermediary string t = hw[Ec] and obtains the string b via
b = a⊕ t. If c = 1, Bob obtains no information about t and, thus, no infor-
mation about b.
Yao’s QOT protocol is exactly as above, except that r = 0, m = 1 and the 1×N
matrix f is (1, 1, . . . , 1), that is, there is no error correction and there is only one
secret bit t = t1 which is the exclusive or of all the bits in w[Ec].
The QKD version is identical to the String-QOT protocol, except that Bob
announces E0 to Alice rather than {E0, E1} and Alice always chooses c = 0. In
this paper, we shall only consider attacks that correspond to attacks that may
be executed by Eve in the QKD version. Clearly, Eve has no control over the set
E0 (and E1), so we shall assume that Bob constructs E0 and E1 as specified in
the protocol. The case in which there is no restriction on E0 and E1 is not more
difficult, but we don’t need it to obtain the security of the QKD protocol.
In most cases, a random variable is represented by an upper case letter,
whereas the value taken by such a variable is represented by a lower case letter,
for instance, the bit c is the value taken by a random variable C. However, if
the value itself is represented by an upper case letter which is typically the case
when the value is a set, we use bold face typesetting for the random variable to
distinguish it from its value.
Let V be Bob’s view at the end of the protocol. Let Pass be the binary
random variable that takes the value 1 if and only if the test result is accepted.
To obtain the security of the above protocol against Bob, for any attack where
E0 and E1 are honestly chosen, we show that there exists a factor of security
ξ > 0 such that, for any initial distribution of probability on B, I(B;V |Pass =
1 ∧ C = 1)× Pr(Pass = 1) ≤ 2−ξn.
6 Bob’s view
Let us assume that the possible values (b, w, θ) of (B,W,Θ) are stored in or-
thonormal states |b, w, θ〉C . The entire view of Bob can be seen as the outcome
of a measurement executed on |b, w, θ〉C |ψw,θ〉. This measurement is not exe-
cuted by Bob alone. For instance, the announcement of θ by Alice is part of this
measurement. Furthermore, we shall generously assume that at the end Alice
announces w[E¯c] to Bob.
Let us analyze the operationMv associated with a view v. We consider a fixed
value of θˆ. At step 4 the measurement operates only on |ψw,θ〉 and returns wˆ: we
consider the classical computation of wˆ as part of the measurement executed by
a dishonest Bob. The corresponding operation on the photons is denoted Mwˆ.
At step 5, R is chosen by Alice and announced to Bob. This has no physical
effect on the initial state, but still the corresponding operation is MR = 2
−n I.
Next, Alice announces the result of the test. This corresponds to a projection
Ppass on the classical part of the state space. Note that this projection is defined
in view of wˆ which is obtained from a measurement on the photons. At step 6
Alice announces θ. The corresponding operation is the projection Pθ = |θ〉〈θ|C .
The announcement of Ec corresponds to the operationMc = 2
−1 I. Similarly, let
Ps and Pa be respectively the projection that corresponds to the announcement
of s and a. We have that Ps projects on the span of the states |w[Ec]〉C such
that S = s and Pa projects on the span of the states |b, w[Ec] 〉C such that A =
T (w[Ec]) ⊕ b = a. Note that, because Bob could have some initial information
about b, the condition A = a may actually provide information about t = b⊕ a.
Finally, let Pw be the projection |w[E¯c] 〉〈w[E¯c] |C which corresponds to the
announcement of w[E¯c].
Note that Bob has no advantage in measuring the photons at step 6 (because
he creates E0 and E1 honestly). So the operation Mwˆ on the photons at step
5 remains the same at step 6. At step 7, Alice announces the information for
privacy amplification and error correction, but this is under Alice’s control and
operates only on the classical part of the initial state. Certainly, at step 8, Bob
is free to execute on the residual state of the photons the complete measurement
of his choice. The final operation on the initial state |b, w, θ〉C |ψw,θ〉 is of the
form Mv = 2
−(n+1)PC |v〉〈φv | where |v〉〈φv | operates on |ψw,θ〉 and PC is the
projection PwPaPsPθ on the classical part |b, w, θ〉C . The projection Ppass does
not appear because it is implicit in PwPθ.
7 The small distance property
In this section, we want to find a property on Mv that can be proven using
the fact that Bob must pass the test. Of course, we also want a property that
implies that Bob has no information when c = 1. We recall that no more than
δn positions i for which θi = θˆi and wi 6= wˆi are tolerated in the test.
Let us consider an example in which Bob stores some photons and measures
them only after that the bases have been announced by Alice. Let ǫ = 8δ. Bob
cannot store much more than ǫn photons, because otherwise he will not pass the
test: half of the photons are used for the test, half of these tested photons will be
in the correct basis and half of these will create an error. Consider the case where
Bob stores exactly ǫn photons. Let F be the set of stored photons and F¯ the set of
non stored photons. To pass the test, Bob measures the non stored photons using
the committed string of bases θˆ[F¯ ] and obtains wˆ[F¯ ]. After that he has learned all
the classical information that Alice announces, Bob measures the stored photons
in the correct bases θ[F ] and obtains w[F ]. The value (wˆ, θˆ, θ) is fixed in the final
view v and the corresponding vector is |φv〉 = |ψwˆ,θˆ[F¯ ]〉|ψw,θ[F ]〉.
In which way the dishonest vector |φv〉 = |ψwˆ,θˆ[F¯ ]〉|ψw,θ[F ]〉 is close from
the honest vector |φv〉 = |ψwˆ,θˆ〉 ? If we expand the state |ψwˆ,θˆ[F¯ ]〉|ψw,θ[F ]〉 in
the basis {|ψ
wˆ,θˆ
〉}, we obtain |ψ
wˆ,θˆ
[F¯ ]〉|ψw,θ[F ]〉 =
∑
α λα|ψα,θˆ〉 where λα 6= 0
only if we have α[F¯ ] = wˆ[F¯ ]. In particular, λα 6= 0 implies d(α, wˆ) ≤ ǫn. Of
course, Bob could choose the photons that he stores at random and in view of
the previous outcomes. In this case, we cannot expect that, for some fixed set
F , λα 6= 0 implies α[F¯ ] = wˆ[F¯ ]. However, it is still reasonable to expect that
λα 6= 0 implies d(α, wˆ) ≤ ǫn. That is, the state |φv〉 must be in the span of the
states |ψ
α,θˆ
〉 with d(α, wˆ) ≤ ǫn. This is exactly the property that is called the
low weight property by Yao [27]. In Yao’s proof, ǫ = 1/40. The test of the QOT
protocol in Yao’s proof tolerates no error at all: δ = 0. However, Yao’s proof
works exactly in the same way even when δ > 0. In section 10 we shall briefly
sketch an alternative proof.
Let us formulate the low-weight property in terms of Mv and the set Ec. We
consider Ec because it contains the relevant positions. Let E ⊆ {1, . . . , n} be
any set of positions and ǫ be some small positive number. Let dE(α, α
′) = #{i ∈
E | αi 6= α
′
i}. If E = {1, . . . , n}, then dE(α, α
′) is the usual Hamming distance.
We denote L1[E, ǫn] the span of the states |ψα,θˆ〉 where dE(α, wˆ) ≤ ǫn. We
denote L0[E, ǫn] the span of the states |ψα,θˆ〉 where dE(α, z) > ǫn. We denote
Pj [E, ǫn] the projection on Lj[E, ǫn].
Let P0 = P0[Ec, ǫn] and P1 = P1[Ec, ǫn]. A vector |φ〉 in the state space
of the photons has the ǫn-small distance property if and only if P0|φ〉 = 0.
In other words, it must be in L1[Ec, ǫn]. The operation Mv has the ǫn-small-
distance property if and only if, for every (b, w, θ), MvP0 |b, w, θ〉C |ψw,θ〉 = 0.
The small-distance property corresponds to what Yao calls the low-weight prop-
erty in [27]. Note that Yao defines the low weight property in terms of all the
positions, not only those in Ec. This difference is not so important: it is clear
that L1[{1, . . . , n}, ǫn] is a subspace of L1[Ec, ǫn], so Yao’s low-weight property
implies the small distance property.
8 Using the small distance property
We now show that if the small distance property holds and c = 1, then v provides
no information at all on b. This corresponds to a generalization of lemma 1 in
Yao’s paper [27]. The minimum distance of a code C is the minimum Hamming
distance d(c, c′) where c and c′ are distinct codewords in C. Let C⊥0 be the span
of the (r +m) rows of the matrix f seen as vectors in GF(2)N . Let dN be the
minimum distance of C⊥0 . Because the matrix f is chosen at random, for any
η > 0, except with negligible probability, we have d > H−1(1− r+m
N
)− η, where
H(x) = −( x lg(x) + (1− x) lg(1− x) ).
Lemma1. If ǫn < dN2 , c = 1 and Mv has the ǫn-small distance property, then
the outcome v provides no information at all on the string b.
Proof. The basic idea is to show that, for a fixed v such that c = 1, the prob-
ability of V = v given B = b, denoted p(v|b), is the same for all b. For every
(w′, θ′), let p(v|b, w′, θ′) = Pr(V = v|B = b ∧W = w ∧ Θ = θ′). We have that
p(v|b) = 4−n
∑
w′,θ′ p(v|b, w
′, θ′). Now, let Pv,b be the set of pair (w
′, θ′) such
that
PC |b, w
′, θ′〉C 6= 0. (1)
Equation (1) must hold if we want to have p(v|b, w′, θ′) 6= 0. Since, we are only
interested in (w′, θ′) that contributes to p(v|b), in what follows we only consider
the pair (w′, θ′) in Pv,b. We obtain that PC operates as the identity operator
on |b, w′, θ′〉C . Furthermore, one may easily check that (1) implies that we can
express the ǫn-small distance property on Mv via the following equation.
〈φv|P0|ψw′,θ′〉 = 0. (2)
Because of these two facts, from hereafter we can ignore the classical part of
the initial state in our computation. Now, equation (1) implies w′[E¯c] = w[E¯c],
θ′ = θ, g w[Ec] = s and hw[Ec] = t = b ⊕ a. The two last constraints can be
written in one equation f w[Ec] = x where x is the concatenation of s and t.
The only degree of freedom is β
def
= w′[Ec] restricted by fβ = x. Let Cx =
{β ∈ {0, 1}N | fβ = x}. There is a one-to-one correspondence between the
strings β ∈ Cx and the pairs (w
′, θ′) ∈ Pv,b. Let p(v|β) = p(v|b, w
′, θ′) and
|ψβ,θ〉 = |ψw′,θ′〉. Ignoring the classical part of the initial state and using (2) we
obtain p(v|β) = |〈φv|ψβ,θ〉|
2 = |〈φv |P0 + P1|ψβ,θ〉|
2 = |〈φv|P1|ψβ,θ〉|
2.
Now, we would like to restrict our analysis to the photons with position in
Ec. One may insert the projection P = |ψw,θ[Ec] 〉〈ψw,θ[Ec] | in front of the
state |ψβ,θ〉 because this projection is implicit in the definition of this state. One
obtains p(v|β) = |〈φv |P1P |ψβ,θ〉|
2. These two projections commute, so we obtain
p(v|β) = |〈φ′v|P1|ψβ,θ〉|
2 where |φ′v〉 = P |φv〉. Note that |φ
′
v〉 = |ψw,θ[E¯c]〉|φ
′′
v 〉
and |ψβ,θ〉 = |ψw,θ[E¯c]〉|ψ˜β,θ〉 where both |φ
′′
v 〉 and |ψ˜β,θ〉 are states for the pho-
tons with position in Ec. We obtain that p(v|β) = |〈φ
′′
v |P1|ψ˜β,θ〉|
2 = |〈φ˜v |ψ˜β,θ〉|
2
where |φ˜v〉 = P1|φ
′′
v 〉 has the ǫn-small-distance property. Now, consider the den-
sity operators ρx = 2
−k
∑
β∈Cx
|ψ˜β,θ〉〈ψ˜β,θ| where k = N − r − m. We shall
show that these density operators cannot be distinguished by any state |φ˜〉 that
has the ǫn-small distance property. In section 9, it is shown that, in the con-
text Ec = E1, for every β ∈ Cx, the matrix representation of ρx in Bob’s basis
{|ψ˜
α,θˆ
〉 | α ∈ {0, 1}N} is given by
(ρx)α,α′ = 2
−N ×
{
0 if (α⊕ α′) 6∈ C⊥0
(−1)(α⊕α
′)⊗β otherwise
For every pair of distinct strings x, x′ ∈ {0, 1}m+r, we have that a necessary
condition for (∆ρ)α,α′ = (ρx)α,α′ − (ρx′)α,α′ 6= 0 is that (α⊕ α
′) belongs to C⊥0
and is different from 0. Therefore, a necessary condition for (∆ρ)α,α′ 6= 0 is that
d(α, α′) > dN . Therefore, for every (α, α′) such that (∆ρ)α,α′ 6= 0, one of |ψα,θˆ〉
or |ψ
α′,θˆ
〉 belongs to L0[E, ǫn]. We obtain
〈φ|∆ρ|φ〉 =
∑
α,α′
(∆ρ)α,α′ 〈φ|ψ˜α,θˆ 〉〈ψ˜α′,θˆ |φ〉 = 0
This concludes the proof. ⊓⊔
9 The density matrices
In this section, we consider only the photons with positions in E1 = Ec. There-
fore θˆ is the opposite of θ, that is, (∀i) θˆi 6= θi. We temporarily remove the tilde
over the symbol ψ. It is as if we considered the general situation whereN photons
are sent from Alice to Bob in a string of bases θ ∈ {+,×}N and we want to find
the matrix representation of the density operators ρx = 2
−k
∑
β∈Cx
|ψβ,θ〉〈ψβ,θ|
in the opposite basis {|ψ
α,θˆ
〉}. We need some basic tool. For every vector β ∈
GF(2)N , the mapping β′ 7→ β′⊕β on GF(2)n corresponds to a unitary transfor-
mation Uβ on the state space of the photons defined via Uβ|ψβ′,θ〉 = |ψβ⊕β′,θ〉.
One may easily check that, for every position i where βi = 1, the transformation
Uβ maps |0〉θˆi into itself and |1〉θˆi into −|1〉θˆi. So, if there is an even number of
positions i where αi = βi = 1, we have Uβ |ψα,θˆ〉 = |ψα,θˆ〉, otherwise, we have
Uβ |ψα,θˆ〉 = −|ψα,θˆ〉. In terms of the operation ⊙ on the vector space GF(2)
n,
we have
Uβ|φα,θˆ〉 =
{
|ψ
α,θˆ
〉 if β ⊙ α = 0
−|ψ
α,θˆ
〉 if β ⊙ α = 1
For every β ∈ Cx, we have Cx = C0 ⊕ β. Therefore, for every β ∈ Cx,
ρx = Uβρ0Uβ , (3)
where we have used U †β = Uβ. For any operator ρ and any β, one may easily
check that, in Bob’s basis,
(UβρUβ)α,α′ = (−1)
(α⊕α′)⊙β × (ρ)α,α′ . (4)
Therefore, in view of (3) and (4), we are done if we have the matrix representation
of the density operator ρ0 in Bob’s basis.
Let k = N−m−r and {β1, . . . , βk} be a basis of C0. For every j = 1, . . . , k, let
C(j) be the span of {β1, . . . , βj} and ρ
(j) = 2−j
∑
β∈C(j) |ψβ,θ〉〈ψβ,θ|. Note that
ρ0 = ρ
(k) and C0 = C
(k). We shall show by induction on j, that for j = 0, . . . , k,
(ρ(j))α,α′ = 2
−N ×
{
0 if (α⊕ α′) 6∈ C(j)⊥
1 otherwise
(5)
The case j = 0 can be easily computed: C(0) = {0} and C(0)⊥ = GF(2)n. We
assume that (5) holds for j and obtain it for j + 1. Because C(j+1) = C(j) ∪
(C(j) ⊕ βj+1), we have that
ρ
(j+1)
0
= 1/2(ρ
(j)
0
+ Uβj+1ρ
(j)
0
Uβj+1). (6)
Therefore, using formula 4, we obtain
(ρ(j+1))α,α′ = 1/2(ρ
(j))α,α′(1− (−1)
(α⊕α′)⊙βj+1).
Note that (ρ(j+1))α,α′ is either 0 or 2
−N . We obtain that (ρ(j+1))α,α′ = 2
−N if
and only if (ρ(j))α,α′ 6= 0 and (α⊕α
′)⊙ βj+1 = 0. So, (ρ
(j+1))α,α′ = 2
−N if and
only if, for every β ∈ C(j+1), (α⊕ α′)⊙ β = 0. This last condition is equivalent
to (α ⊕ α′) ∈ C(j+1)⊥. This concludes the induction. Using the density matrix
of ρ0 = ρ
(k), together with formula 3 and 4, we finally obtain that, for every
β ∈ Cx,
(ρx)α,α′ = 2
−N ×
{
0 if (α⊕ α′) 6∈ C⊥0
(−1)(α⊕α
′)⊗β otherwise
10 Proving the small distance property
Consider an example where Bob chooses a random bit OK and stores all the
photons when and only when OK = 1. In this case, Bob passes the test with a
probability a little bit greater than 1/2 and the small distance property holds
with probability 1/2. The point is that we should not expect that, if Bob has a
significant probability to pass the test, then the small distance property always
holds. In this example, except with negligible probability, the small distance
property holds when Bob passes the test.
Consider another example where Bob commits θˆ = +n, measures every pho-
ton in a fixed basis θ′ and commits the outcome wˆ. The fixed basis θ′ cannot
be too far away from + because otherwise Bob will not pass the test. With-
out loss of generality, assume that the magnitude of +〈0|0〉θ′ = +〈1|1〉θ′ = cθ′
is close to 1 and the magnitude of +〈0|1〉θ′ = +〈1|0〉θ′ = sθ′ is close to 0. The
value wˆ is included in v and |φv〉 = |ψwˆ,θ′〉. If we expand |φv〉 in Bob’s ba-
sis +n we obtain |φv〉 =
∑
α〈ψα,+n |ψwˆ,θ′〉|ψα,+n〉. Note that |〈ψα,+n |ψwˆ,θ′〉| =
|sθ′ |
d(α,wˆ)× |dθ′ |
n−d(α,wˆ). So |λα| = |〈ψα,+n |ψwˆ,θ′〉| is very small when d(α, wˆ) is
large. In this second example, the small distance property does not hold, but it
almost holds.
Now, we briefly sketch a proof that, for every strategy used by Bob, except
with negligible probability, if Bob passes the test, then the small distance prop-
erty almost holds. A complete proof is found in [27]. Let γ = 10−6 and Info be
the binary random variable that takes the value 0 if and only if
‖MvP0|ψw,θ〉‖
2 ≤ 2−γn‖Mv|ψw,θ〉‖
2.
The condition Info = 0 means that, for all practical purposes, we can use the
small distance property, obtain (2), etc. in our proof of lemma 1.
So, we want to obtain that if Pr(Pass = 1) > 2−γn then
Pr(Info = 1 | Pass = 1) ≤ 2−γn. (7)
The variable Info concerns the final view of Bob. It is easier to consider the
situation just after the announcement of θ. Therefore, let us consider the ratio
r(pass , θ, R, wˆ) =
Tr(P0Π(pass,θ,R,wˆ) P0 ρ)
Tr(Π(pass,θ,R,wˆ) ρ)
where ρ is Alice’s preparation and Π(pass,θ,R,wˆ) =M
†
(θ,pass,R,wˆ)M(θ,pass,R,wˆ). We
shall briefly sketch why Pr(Pass = 1) > 2−2γn implies that
〈r(pass , θ, R, wˆ)〉Pass =1 ≤ 2
−2γn (8)
where 〈r〉Pass =1 denotes the expected value of r in the context Pass = 1. This do
the job because Pr(Pass = 1) > 2−γn implies that Pr(Pass = 1) > 2−2γn and
expanding the expected value 〈r(pass , θ, R, wˆ)〉Pass =1 and after some algebra,
one obtains that (8) implies (7). One may check that
Tr(Π(pass,θ,R,wˆ) ρ) = p(pass , θ, R, wˆ)
= 8−n
∑
α
‖Mwˆ Ppass [T0 ∩R, δn] |ψα,θˆ〉 ‖
2 (9)
Tr(P0Π(pass,R,θ,wˆ) P0 ρ) = 8
−n
∑
α
‖Mwˆ Ppass [T0 ∩R, δn]P0 |ψα,θˆ〉 ‖
2 (10)
where Ppass [T0 ∩ R, δn] refers to section 7. The right hand side of (9) and (10)
can also be obtained from the following definition of Pass , Θ,R and Wˆ . Alice
chooses θ and R as usual, but prepares a perfectly random state |ψ
α,θˆ
〉 using
θˆ rather than θ. Bob measures in the bases θˆ to obtain α and then executes
Mwˆ to obtain wˆ. Finally, Alice announces R and θ. Let J [E, τn] = 0 if and
only if dE(α, wˆ) ≤ τn, and let Pass = J [T0 ∩R, δn]. The values of (9) and (10)
are respectively Pr(Θ = θ ∧ J [T0 ∩ R, δn] = pass ∧ R = R,∧ Wˆ = wˆ) and
Pr(J [Ec, ǫ] = 0 ∧ Θ = θ ∧ J [T0∩R, δn] = pass ∧ R = R,∧ Wˆ = wˆ). Equation 8
simply means that Pr(J [Ec, ǫ] = 0 | J [T0 ∩R, δ] = 1) ≤ 2
−2γn. So, it is sufficient
to show Pr(J [Ec, ǫ] = 0 ∧ J [T0 ∩ R, δ] = 1) ≤ 2
−4γn. For an appropriate ǫ > δ,
this is not hard to show. This concludes our sketchy proof of this section.
We are grateful to Eli Biham, Gilles Brassard, Claude Cre´peau, Christopher
Fuchs, Tal Mor and Andrew Yao for fruitful discussions. We especially thank
Tal Mor and Eli Biham for showing us preliminary version of [7] and a prelimi-
nary and partial version of [10]. These did not yet consider the density matrices
approach for the case r > 0 or m > 1, but contained the density matrices for
the case r = 0 and m = 1. At the time, we also had these density matrices, but
the way they presented it helped us to make a guess on the shape of the density
matrices when r > 0 and m > 1, and this guess has been a great help in our
computation. Our guess has also been proven independently in later versions of
[10] in the context of the collective attack.
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